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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between environmental policy and growth when green
preferences are endogenously determined by education and pollution. The government can imple-
ment a tax on pollution and recycle the revenue in public pollution abatement and/or education
subsidy (influencing green behaviors). When agent’s preferences for the environment are highly
sensitive to environmental damages, the economy can converge to a balanced growth path equi-
librium with damped oscillations. Therefore, we identify two objectives that environmental policy
seeks to address: remove oscillations, source of intergenerational inequalities, and enhance the
long-term growth rate. We show that a tighter tax allows to achieve both objectives when the
tax revenue is well allocated between education and direct environmental protection.
JEL Classification: I25; O44; Q58
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1 Introduction
The link between growth and the environment is a fundamental issue in environmental economics,
as highlighted in the literature reviews of Brock and Taylor (2005) and Xepapadeas (2005). One of
the main questions raised is the role of environmental policy in attaining a sustainable development,
where economic growth is compatible with a non-damaging environment. To achieve such a goal,
policy makers have several economic levers and can combine them, as underlined by OECD (2007).1
The most obvious instrument is pollution taxation, introduced to reduce environmentally harmful
∗We would like to thank Carine Nourry and Thomas Seegmuller for their wise advices, Mouez Fodha, Oded Galor,
Omar Licandro, Katheline Schubert and Cees Withagen for their helpful comments. We are also grateful to participants
at the conferences OLG days 2013 Clermont-Ferrand, LAGV 2013 Marseille and PET 2013 Lisbon.
†Centre de la Vieille Charite´, 2 rue de la Charite´, 13236 Marseille Cedex 02, France. E-mail: con-
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1OECD (2007) highlights two main reasons to justify the use of instrument mixes: the “multi-aspect” nature of
environmental issues and the fact that instruments can reinforce each other.
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activities. But the governments may also invest in pollution abatement activities (e.g. water treat-
ment, waste management, investment in renewable energy, conservation of forests...) or in more
indirect interventions which aim to modify households’ behaviors. For example, OECD (2008) refers
to education as “one of the most powerful tools for providing individuals with the appropriate skills
and competencies to become sustainable consumers”. The importance of this instrument is also illus-
trated by the United Nations which declares the decade 2005-2014 as the “UN Decade of Education
for Sustainable Development”.2
In the light of the development of policies directed to consumers’ behaviors, it seems particularly
relevant to consider the role of agents’ green preferences on environmental issues. Moreover, as
European Commission (2008) points out, households are becoming more aware of environmental
issues and of their role in environmental protection since the recent decades, reflecting that these
preferences evolve over time. The purpose of this paper is thus to study how environmental policy
affects growth performance, when individual preferences for the environment are endogenous.
A number of studies deals with the link between environmental policy and growth, however no
consensus exists. Ono (2003a) underlines the intergenerational effect of environmental taxation. In
his paper, tax reduces the polluting production, but improves the level of environmental quality
bequeathed to future generation, such that there exists an intermediary level of tax that enhances
the long-term growth. Other contributions examine this issue by considering that human capital
accumulation is the engine of growth. In a Lucas model, Gradus and Smulders (1993) emphasize that
an improvement in environmental quality has a positive effect on long-term growth when pollution
affects directly human capital accumulation. More recent papers underline that, even without such
assumption, a tighter environmental tax can favor education and hence growth at the expense of
polluting activities. For example, in a model with a R&D sector reducing pollution, Grimaud and
Tournemaine (2007) obtain this result as the tax increases the relative price of the polluting good. For
finite lifetime, Pautrel (2011) finds that an increase in tax enhances growth as long as the abatement
sector is more human capital intensive that the final output sector, while in Pautrel (2012) this result
arises because pollution stems from physical capital.3
We depart from these papers in two major ways. First, we analyze an environmental policy with
possible “instrument mixes”. The government can implement a tax on pollution and recycle tax
revenues in two types of environmental support: a direct one through public pollution abatement
and a more indirect one through education subsidy.
Second, we assume that agents’ preferences for the environment are endogenous. More precisely,
we consider that green preferences are affected positively by both the individual human capital
and the level of pollution, as supported by literature. A wide range of empirical studies identifies
education as a relevant individual determinant of environmental preferences (see Blomquist and
Whitehead, 1998; Witzke and Urfei, 2001 or European Commission, 2008). The intuition is that
the more educated agent is, the more she is informed about environmental issues, and the more she
2See resolution 57/254 of United Nations General Assembly of 2002.
3Pautrel (2012) has a similar result than Gradus and Smulders (1993), in which pollution is due to physical capital,
but it does not require that pollution affects directly education.
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can be concerned about environmental protection. Likewise, environmental issues, as climate change
or air pollution, harm welfare and push households to react. Among other explanations, pollution
affects agents’ well-being by damaging their health status (through mortality and morbidity) and
by depreciating the environmental quality bequeathed to future generations. Schumacher (2009)
highlights that when pollution is high, agents are more likely to be environmentally concerned and
to act for the environment.
Considering an endogenous environmental awareness, our analysis is also related to the recent
contribution of Prieur and Bre´chet (2013), in which green preferences depend on human capital.
The authors emphasize that the economy may be caught in a steady state without economic growth,
while education policy can be used to achieve an asymptotic balanced growth path with sustained
growth. Here, we extend this paper considering that education choices are not exogenous but stem
from paternalistic altruism and that environmental preferences are driven by both human capital
and pollution.4
In our overlapping generations model, growth is driven by human capital accumulation and
environmental quality. Human capital depends on education spending chosen by altruistic parents,
while the law of motion of the environment is in line with John and Pecchenino (1994). Production
creates pollution flow, which damages environmental quality, whereas abatement activities improve
it. To well identify consumer’s environmental preferences, we use an impure altruism a` la Andreoni
(1990), where the contribution to the public good arises from private preferences for this good (pure
altruism) and from a joy of giving. With this formalization, public and private contributions are no
longer perfect substitutes, such that the controversial fiscal neutrality result of purely altruistic
models does not hold.5 Consequently, we consider two different incentives to explain pollution
abatement: the level of environmental quality and the contribution itself to the environment.
With the present model, two regimes are distinguished: a regime with private contribution to
pollution abatement and a regime without private contribution to this good. We provide conditions
for the existence of a unique positive stable balanced growth path (hereafter BGP) with sustainable
development. Depending on the share of public spending in public maintenance and the level of
the tax, the BGP can be with or without private maintenance. We reveal that when the BGP
is characterized by private pollution abatement, endogenous environmental concerns may generate
damped oscillations, for low tolerance to pollution. Specifically, the feedback effect of human capital
and environmental quality on green preferences influences the trade-off between private choices,
which generates oscillations. Such complex dynamics leads to significant variations in the welfare
across generations, which correspond to intergenerational inequalities along the convergence path
(see Seegmuller and Verche`re, 2004).
While the effect of environmental policy is generally studied in the long run, we underline that
4For a paper considering the effect of environmental quality on green concerns, see Schumacher and Zou (2013).
Nevertheless, they assume that environmental quality has a discrete impact on preferences.
5In other words, when the government increases spending for the public good, there is not a complete crowding out
effect on private contribution. Such impure altruism and non-neutrality are supported by empirical evidence. See Ribar
and Wilhelm, (2002) or Crumpler and Grossman (2008) for a review on charitable giving and Menges et al (2005), on
environmental contribution.
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the short-term analysis represents also a crucial issue. Thus, two objectives of the government are
identified: avoid oscillations in the short run, and achieve the highest growth rate in the long run.
We emphasize that an increase in tax allows to address both short-and long-term objectives as long
as the tax revenue is well allocated. More precisely, an intermediary allocation of the budget between
public maintenance and education ensures that the economy converges to a BGP without private
maintenance and with a sufficiently high support to education. Indeed, in this regime, environmental
maintenance is entirely supported by public authorities. Consequently, there is no trade-off between
private choices and oscillations never occurs. To achieve this regime, and hence avoid short-term
issue, the share of budget in public maintenance has to be high enough. However, we show that an
intermediary allocation of tax revenue is required to reach the highest long-term growth rate of both
human capital and environmental quality. In this way, the budget devoted to pollution abatement
is sufficiently high to be in the regime without private maintenance, where environmental quality is
good, but education support is also sufficient so that the negative effect of tax on available income
is more than offset by the positive effect of education subsidy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the theoretical model. Section 3
focus on the BGP and the transitional dynamics. In Section 4, we examine short-and long-term
implications of environmental policy. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Technical details are relegated to
an Appendix.
2 The model
Consider an overlapping generations economy, with discrete time indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞.
Households live for two periods, childhood and adulthood, but take all decisions during their second
period of life. At each date t, a new generation of N identical agents is born (N > 1). We assume
no population growth.
2.1 Production
Production of the consumption good is carried out by a single representative firm. The output
is produced according to a constant returns to scale technology:
Yt = AHt (1)
where Ht is the aggregate stock of human capital and A > 0 measures the technology level. Defining
yt ≡ YtN as the output per worker and ht ≡ HtN as the human capital per worker, we have the following
production function per capita: yt = Aht.
The government collects revenues through a tax rate 0 6 τ < 1 on production, which is the source
of pollution. By assuming perfect competition, the profit-maximization problem yields the following
factor price:
wt = A(1− τ) (2)
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2.2 Consumer’s behavior
Individual born in t−1 cares about her adult consumption level ct, her child’s human capital ht+1,
the current level of environmental quality Qt and the future environment through altruism. To well
identify these environmental preferences, we use an impure altruism in line with Andreoni (1990).
Agent gets welfare for the total level of public good (i.e. the future environmental quality Qt+1) but
also from her action to contribute to this good (i.e. environmental maintenance mt). With the joy
of giving for mt, public and private contributions are no longer perfect substitutes, such that the
controversial neutrality result of purely altruistic models does not hold. Preferences are represented
by the following utility function of a representative agent:
U(ct,mt, ht+1, Qt+1) = ln ct + γ1t ln(ε1 mt + ε2 Qt+1) + γ2 ln ht+1 + γ3 Qtν (3)
with γ1t, γ2, γ3, ε1, ε2 and ν > 0.
The parameter γ3 captures taste for the current environmental quality. It corresponds to a
usual well-being due to the environment but is taken as given by agent and not related with altruism
concerns. The weight γ2 is a paternalistic altruism factor for child’s human capital, such that parents
finance the child’s education, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
The weight γ1t captures the environmental awareness. We consider that these environmental
preferences are affected negatively by the level of environmental quality (Qt) and positively by the
individual human capital (ht), as supported by literature. Pollution, affecting welfare, has an impact
on environmental behaviors: when pollution is high, agents are more likely to be concerned by the
environment and to act in favor of it, as underlines Schumacher (2009). The worst environmental
quality, the more the individual is able to realize the badness of the situation and therefore the more
she has an incentive to protect the environment. At the same time, empirical behavioral economics
literature identifies education as a determinant of the contribution to the environment (See Blomquist
and Whitehead, 1998 or Witzke and Urfei, 2001). The economic intuition is that the more an agent
is educated, the more she may be informed about environmental issues and their consequences, and
thus the more she can be concerned about it. We assume that γ1t = γ1(ht, Qt) where γ1 is increasing
and concave with respect to h, and decreasing and convex with respect to Q. In particular, we
consider the following functional form:6
γ1t ≡ βht + ηQt
κht +Qt
(4)
with parameters β, κ, η > 0 and β > ηκ. The parameter −κ represents the lower bound of envi-
ronment per unit of human capital, while β and η embody respectively the weight of human capital
and of environmental in green awareness. Let us underline that when β = ηκ, the environmental
awareness is constant.
During childhood, individual does not make decisions. She is reared by her parents and benefits
6For a similar form, see Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) who use it to model the effect of pollution on longevity.
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from education. When adult, she supplies inelastically one unit of labor remunerated at the wage wt
according to her human capital level ht. She allocates this income to consumption ct, education per
child et and environmental maintenance mt.7 Furthermore, the government can subsidy education
at the rate 0 6 θet < 1, reducing the private cost of education. The budget constraint for an adult
with human capital ht is:
ct +mt + et(1− θet ) = wtht (5)
The human capital of the child ht+1 is produced with the private education expenditure et and
the human capital of the parents ht:
ht+1 =  etµht1−µ (6)
with  > 0, the efficiency of human capital accumulation. The parameter 0 < µ < 1 is compatible
with endogenous growth and captures the elasticity of human capital to private education, while
1− µ represents the share of human capital resulting from intergenerational transmission within the
family.
The law of motion of environmental quality is defined by:
Qt+1 = (1− α)Qt + b(mt +Mt +NGmt )− aYt (7)
where α > 0 is the natural degradation of the environment and Yt represents the pollution flow
due to production in previous period. The parameter a > 0 corresponds to the emission rate of
pollution, while b > 0 is the efficiency of environmental maintenance. The abatement activities are
represented by a Cournot-Nash equilibrium approach. Each agent determines her own environmental
maintenance (mt), taking the others’ contribution (Mt) as given. The government can provide public
environmental maintenance NGmt > 0, which has the same efficiency than the private one. Following
the seminal contribution of John and Pecchenino (1994), Q is an environmental quality index which
can take positive or negative values and with an autonomous value of 0 in the absence of human
intervention. This index may embody, for example, the inverse of the concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere (like the chlorofluorocarbons, CFCs), or a local environmental public good
such as the quality of groundwater in a specific area.
The consumer program is summarized by:
max
et,mt
, U(ct,mt, ht+1, Qt+1, Qt) = ln ct + γ1t ln(ε1 mt + ε2 Qt+1) + γ2 ln ht+1 + γ3 Qνt (8)
s.t ct +mt + et(1− θet ) = wtht
ht+1 =  etµht1−µ
Qt+1 = (1− α)Qt + b(mt +Mt +NGmt )− aYt
with mt > 0.
7See Kotchen and Moore (2008) for empirical evidences of private provision of environmental public goods.
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2.3 The government
The design of environmental policy represents a major challenge for governments. Among other
reports, OECD (2007 and 2008) recommends the revenue recycling of tax on polluting activities in
order to complete the governmental action. This kind of policy is observable in several countries.
For example, in France, the government implements a general tax on polluting activities (TGAP)
and transfers revenues to the French Environment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME) that
funds activities in favor of environment. While environmental policy is often studied through tax-
ation in theoretical literature, there exist several policy levers. Policy makers can support direct
environmental actions (e.g. conservation of forests and soils, water treatment, waste management),
but also more indirect actions attempting to change behaviors (e.g. environmental education).
In this model, in order to study such environmental policy, we consider the following policy
scheme. Since pollution is a by-product of the production process, the government taxes the output
at rate τ and the public budget is spent on public environmental maintenance NGmt or/and on
education subsidy θet . The government’s budget is balanced at each period, such that:
N(θet et +Gmt ) = τYt (9)
We define the share of public expenditure devoted to public maintenance 0 6 σ 6 1, and to education
subsidy (1− σ), assumed constant:
σ = NG
m
t
τYt
; 1− σ = Nθ
e
t et
τYt
(10)
Thus, fiscal policy is summarized by two instruments {τ ; σ, takenasgivenbyconsumers.
2.4 Equilibrium
The maximization of the consumer program (8) leads to the following first order conditions on
education expenditure and on environmental maintenance:
∂U
∂et
= 0⇔ 1− θ
e
t
ct
= γ2µ
et
(11)
∂U
∂mt
6 0⇔ 1
ct
> γ1t(ε1 + ε2b)
ε1mt + ε2Qt+1
(12)
From equations (5), (7) and the first order conditions (11) and (12), we deduce the optimal choices in
terms of education and maintenance in two regimes: an interior solution, where individuals invest in
environmental protection mt > 0 (hereafter pm) and a corner solution without private contribution
to the environment mt = 0 (hereafter npm).
et =

(
γ2µ
1−θet
)( (ε1+ε2b)wtht+ε2[(1−α)Qt−aYt+b(Mt+NGmt )]
(1+γ1t+γ2µ)(ε1+ε2b)
)
pm
wthtγ2µ
(1+γ2µ)(1−θet ) npm
(13)
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mt =

γ1t(ε1+ε2b)wtht−ε2(1+γ2µ)[(1−α)Qt−aANht+b(Mt+NGmt )]
(1+γ1t+γ2µ)(ε1+ε2b) pm
0 npm
(14)
At the symmetric equilibrium, Mt = mt(N−1), the wage equilibrium is wt = A(1−τ), the production
function is Yt = ANht and the government budget constraint is given by (9). The Nash intertemporal
equilibria are thus given by:
et =

γ2µ[(ε1+ε2bN)A(1−τ)ht+ε2((1−α)Qt+ANht(bστ−a))]
γ1t(ε1+ε2b)+(1+γ2µ)(ε1+ε2bN) + (1− σ)τAht pm
Aht[γ2µ(1−τ)+τ(1−σ)(1+γ2µ)]
1+γ2µ npm
(15)
mt =

γ1t(ε1+ε2b)Aht(1−τ)−ε2(1+γ2µ)[(1−α)Qt+ANht(bστ−a)]
γ1t(ε1+ε2b)+(1+γ2µ)(ε1+ε2bN) pm
0 npm
(16)
Education spending depends positively on environmental quality. The better the environment, the
lower the optimal amount of maintenance activities, as a result, individual can devote more resources
to educate her child.
The public policy instruments shape education and abatement spendings differently. An increase
in tax implies a negative income effect (wage decreases) but still favors education spending when
public expenditure is sufficiently devoted to education subsidies (σ low).8 Conversely, an increase in
tax always affects negatively maintenance activities. In addition to the negative income effect, the tax
increases the public pollution abatement which crowds out private maintenance. Nevertheless, public
spending substitutes only partially to the private one due to the direct benefit from contribution to
the environment.
Let us introduce, for the rest of the paper, a green development index Xt, equal to environmental
quality per unit of human capital: Xt ≡ Qtht .
Note that, due to the log-linear utility, ε1mt + ε2Qt+1 has to be positive. This condition can be
expressed as:
Xt >

−A[ε2N(b(1−τ)+bτσ−a)+ε1(1−τ)]
ε2(1−α) ≡ X∃ pm
0 npm
(17)
The environmental awareness, given by (4), can be rewritten in terms of X:
γ1t =
β + ηXt
κ+Xt
(18)
The parameter −κ represents a critical threshold of pollution as a limit not to exceed, with respect
to the individual human capital. The higher κ is, the higher is the tolerated level of pollution per
unit of human capital (i.e. the lower X can be). Thus we will also refer to κ as the tolerance to
pollution. To examine the implications of the critical threshold, we set −κ > X∃, and to ensure that
γ1t > 0, we consider Xt > −κ.
8 ∂et
∂τ
> 0
(
resp. ∂et
∂τ
< 0
)
, when σ < γ1tc1+c3
γ1tc1+c3+ε1γ2µ
(
resp. 1 > σ > γ1tc1+c3
γ1tc1+c3+ε1γ2µ
)
.
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Using equation (16), we deduce the following central property. The solution without private
environmental maintenance occurs when:
Xt >
A [γ1t(ε1 + ε2b)(1− τ)− ε2N(1 + γ2µ)(bστ − a)]
ε2(1 + γ2µ)(1− α) (19)
In this case, the level of environmental quality is so high and/or the level of human capital so low,
that the private abatement of pollution is given up. Policy favors the occurrence of this regime. When
τ is positive, the economy is more likely to be characterized by no maintenance activities, especially
if σ is positive, since public maintenance partially substitutes for private one. But when revenue
recycling is entirely devoted to education (σ = 0), agent still replaces some abatement activities by
education, as the last becomes relatively less costly. The condition (19) can be written as:
P(Xt) ≡ X2t ε2(1 + γ2µ)(1− α) +Xt[ε2(1 + γ2µ)(κ(1− α) +AN(bστ − a))−Aηc1(1− τ)]
−A[βc1(1− τ)− κ(bστ − a)Nε2(1 + γ2µ)] > 0
(20)
P(Xt) = 0 admits one solution, Xt = Λ > 0.9 Thus, households invest in environmental protection
when Xt ∈ (−κ,Λ).
Using the human capital accumulation (6) and the environmental quality process (7), and the first
order conditions (15) and (16), we finally obtain the dynamic equation characterizing equilibrium
paths:
Definition 1. Given the initial condition X0 = h0Q0 > −κ, the intertemporal equilibrium is the
sequence (Xt)t∈N which satisfies, at each t, Xt+1 = F(Xt), with:
F(Xt) =

(1−α) Xt [γ1t c1+c2]+AN [γ1t c1b(1−τ)+(γ1c1+c2)(bτσ−a)]
[γ2µA c3(1−τ)+γ2µε2[(1−α)Xt+AN(bστ−a)]+(1−σ)τA(γ1t c1+(1+γ2µ)c3)]µ[γ1t c1+(1+γ2µ)c3]1−µ pm
(1−α)Xt+AN(bστ−a)

[
γ2µA(1−τ)+(1−σ)τA(1+γ2µ)
1+γ2µ
]µ npm (21)
We define the endogenous growth rate of human capital gH , and environmental quality gQ, using
equations (6), (7), (15) and (16):
1 + gHt =


[
γ2µ[A(1−τ)c3+ε2((1−α)Xt+AN(bστ−a))]+(1−σ)τA(γ1tc1+c3(1+γ2µ))
γ1tc1+(1+γ2µ)c3
]µ
pm

[
A[γ2µ(1−τ)+τ(1−σ)(1+γ2µ)]
1+γ2µ
]µ
npm
(22)
where c1, c2 and c3, three positive constants defined by c1 ≡ ε1 + ε2b ; c2 ≡ ε1(1 + γ2µ) and
c3 ≡ ε1 + ε2bN . In the npm regime, human capital growth rate is constant, as education spending
does not depend on the environment. The pm regime is characterized by a human capital growth rate
increasing in the green development index, directly and indirectly though environmental awareness
γ1t.
9We have Λ > 0 when βc1(1− τ)− κ(bστ − a)Nε2(1 + γ2µ) > 0 and Λ = 0 otherwise.
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1 + gQt =

(1−α)Xt(γ1tc1+c2)+AN [γ1t c1(1−τ)b+(γ1tc1+c2)(bτσ−a)]
Xt(γ1tc1+c3(1+γ2µ)) pm
1− α+ AN(bστ−a)Xt npm
(23)
In the case with private maintenance, the green development indexXt has a direct negative impact
on the growth rate of environmental quality and an indirect positive effect through environmental
awareness γ1t. In the corner solution, gQt is always negative without public abatement.10 However,
when the government intervenes, the growth of the environmental quality at the corner may be
positive for sufficiently high share of policy devoted to public environmental maintenance (σ).
From (22) and (23), we make the following assumption in order to guarantee that positive growth
rates of environmental quality and human capital are possible when X is positive.11
Assumption 1. Let σMin(τ) ≡ a(ηc1+c2)−bηc1(1−τ)bτ(ηc1+c2) and σMax(τ) ≡
Aγ2µ+Aτ−−1/µ(1+γ2µ)
Aτ(1+γ2µ) . We as-
sume:
a) γ2µA
1
µ > 1 + γ2µ and ba > max
{
ηc1+c2
ηc1
, 11+γ2µ
}
b) σMin(τ) < σ < σMax(τ).12
This Assumption has to be satisfy otherwise environmental quality index and/or human capital go
down, and the economy always collapses. The Assumption 1.a implies that human capital accumu-
lation and environmental maintenance are sufficiently efficient.13 Note that the second inequality of
Assumption 1.a entails that b > a, which is relevant since maintenance is devoted to the protection
of the environment, contrary to pollution flow which is only a residual of the production process, as
Mariani et al. (2010) argue. The Assumption 1.b restrains some policy schemes. For low level of
tax, all allocation σ are possible, while for high level, extreme allocations between public spendings
are excluded.
3 Balanced growth path and transitional dynamics
We examine in this section the existence of a BGP equilibrium characterized as:
Definition 2. A balanced growth path (BGP) satisfies Definition 1 and has the following additional
properties: the stock of human capital and environmental quality grow at the same and constant
rate gi, with subscripts i = {pm, npm} denoting respectively the regime with Private Maintenance
and the regime where there is No Private Maintenance. This equilibrium path is such that the green
development index Xt is constant and defined by Xt+1 = Xt = X¯i.
10When mt = 0 and σ = 0, gQt is increasing in Xt: an increase in Xt fits in with a human capital decline and hence
with a lower pollution.
11The assumption is set so that it is valid for all values that γ1t can take across time.
12Under Assumption 1.a, σMin(τ) is increasing in τ from limτ→0 σMin = −∞ to limτ→1 σMin = a/b, while σMax(τ)
is decreasing in τ from limτ→0 σMax = +∞ to limτ→0 σMax = 1− 11/µA .
13This condition also implies that the threshold level ensuring the existence X∃, expressed in (17), is negative.
10
From Definitions 1 and 2 and equations (18) and (20), we emphasize the properties of the dynamic
equation characterizing equilibrium paths, F :
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1 and for β > ηκ:
• When X < Λ, limX→−κF(X) = AN(b(1−τ)+bτσ−a)−(1−α)κ[A(1−σ)τ ]µ .
i) If N > N¯ , we have limX→−κF(X) > −κ.
ii) If N 6 N¯ , we have limX→−κF(X) 6 −κ.
F(0) > 0 and limX→Λ− F(X) = v.
• When X > Λ, F is increasing and linear in X, F(Λ) = v and limX→+∞F(X) = +∞.
with N¯ = κ(1−α−(A(1−σ)τ)
µ)
A[b(1−τ)+bτσ−a] and v is a positive constant.
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
We focus on the case where population is not too low:
Assumption 2 N > N¯
The extreme case N 6 N¯ is of minor interest in our model because the overall reaction of agents
would never be sufficient to improve the environment when the environmental quality tends to its
critical level (−κ), whatever individual’s efforts.14
From Lemma 1, we deduce the existence of the BGP X¯i corresponding to the solutions of equation
F(X¯i) = X¯i, where F(X¯i) is obtained with equations (18) and (21):
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and β > ηκ, there exists a unique positive BGP (X¯i), such
that, according to a critical threshold σˆ(τ):
• When σ > σˆ(τ), the BGP is in the regime without private maintenance (npm).
• When σ < σˆ(τ), the BGP is in the regime with private maintenance (pm).
where σˆ(τ) is a decreasing function of τ , with limτ→0 σˆ(τ) = +∞ and limτ→1 σˆ(τ) = a/b.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
The policy makes possible a sustainable BGP equilibrium without private abatement, according
to the share of public spending devoted to environmental protection (σ). If it is sufficiently high,
households may stop investing in private maintenance in long run, as underlined in Proposition 1.
However, when environmental awareness (γ1) is too high, the tax rate (τ) required to the existence
of the regime without private maintenance is high.
14The reverse assumption does not change our results. It would only make possible the existence of traps for extreme
values of X0.
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We observe that endogenous green preferences may lead to extreme behaviors. When environ-
mental quality tends to its critical threshold −κ, green preferences soar implying a huge effort in
maintenance at the expense of education. The significant improvement of X allows to catch up the
lag in human capital and to achieve a sustainable development. However, as long as a part of public
revenue is devoted to education (σ < 1), policy smooths extreme behaviors in terms of maintenance,
as the government compels agents to invest sufficiently in education.
From Lemma 1, we derive the stability properties of the BGP presented in Proposition 1. When
the BGP is in the regime without private maintenance, we obtain an explicit solution whose dynamics
is easily deduced. To analyze the stability of the equilibrium in the regime with private maintenance,
we normalized X¯pm to one, using the scaling parameter . The results are then appraised in the
following proposition and illustrated in Figure 1 :
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and β > ηκ:
• The BGP in the regime without private maintenance, X¯npm, is globally and monotonously
stable.
• The BGP in the regime with private maintenance, X¯pm, is locally stable and there exists a κ¯
such that:
– for κ > κ¯: the convergence is monotonous.
– for κ < κ¯: Without education policy, there exists a β˜ such that the dynamics is oscillatory
(resp. monotonous) when β > β˜ (resp. β < β˜). With education policy, the convergence
may be oscillatory for intermediary values of β.
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
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Figure 1: Dynamics
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As underlined in Proposition 2, the economy may display damped oscillations because of endoge-
nous concerns.15 The emergence of complex dynamics is explained by the feedback effect between
green development index and environmental awareness, which affects the trade-off between educa-
tion and maintenance. In the absence of private maintenance, this trade-off does not exist and the
dynamics is always monotonous. Whereas when agent invests in environmental protection, cyclical
convergence may occur and can be described as follows: an increase in γ1t encourages private main-
tenance investment at the expense of education spending. For the next generation, it generates a fall
in ht+1, a raise in Qt+1, and so a decrease in γ1t+1. These modifications entail multiple effects on the
private choices: they all shape negatively mt+1 whereas for et+1 the impact is ambiguous. Indeed,
education spending is affected positively by the improvement of environmental quality Qt+1 and by
the decrease in the green preferences γ1t+1, while the fall in human capital ht+1 entails a negative
income effect. As long as the positive impacts on education exceed the negative income effect, the
economy displays oscillations. The opposite variation in ht+1 acts as a brake on oscillations, i.e. a
stabilizing effect, such that cyclical variations are damped.
Oscillatory dynamics is observed only when agent’s tolerance to pollution (κ) is sufficiently low.
More precisely, in the absence of public intervention in education (σ = 1), the economy displays
oscillations for low tolerance to pollution (κ) and high sensitivity of concerns to human capital
(β). In this case, green preferences are more sensitive to variation in X.16 Thus, environmental
awareness (γ1) experiences important variations along the converging trajectory, and so do levels of
environmental quality and human capital.
As long as the government subsidies education (σ ∈ [0, 1)), the conditions to observe oscillatory
cases are less obvious. Environmental awareness does not affect the trade-off between education and
private maintenance in the same way, as a part of private education spending is now independent on
agent’s preferences. For low β, as previously, agent’s green preferences are not sensitive enough to
variation in X to generate complex dynamics. However, when green preferences are highly sensitive
to human capital, the result is more complex. A very high β implies an important environmental
awareness, such that agents greatly value maintenance at the expense of human capital and education
is mainly driven by policy. Thus, variations in private choices are smoothed and the economy may
display damped oscillations only for intermediate level of β.17
Our results in transitional dynamics are opposed to Zhang (1999), who finds that greener prefer-
ences are necessary to avoid complicated dynamic structure.18 Instead, they are close to Ono (2003b),
who argues that concerns for the environment would cause oscillations. However, his mechanism goes
through innovation and corresponds to higher levels of exogenous green preferences, while in our setup
such dynamics arises from the endogenization of environmental awareness and the feedback effect of
15At the limit case β = ηκ, γ1 is exogenous and the dynamics is always monotonous. The proof is available upon
request.
16Function γ1(Xt) is more convex in Xt when κ is low and/or β is high.
17When public budget is mainly devoted to maintenance (σ high), damped oscillations always occur for intermediate
β.
18He develops a model a` la John and Pecchenino (1994) to study the cases of nonlinear dynamics and endogenous
fluctuations.
13
environment and education on green behaviors.
When economy experiences damped oscillations, the convergence toward the BGP is character-
ized by oscillations in the levels and the growth rates of human capital and environmental quality.
Generations with high environmental quality over human capital ratio are followed by generations
with low environmental quality over human capital. As Seegmuller and Verche`re (2004) show, such
cyclical convergence make the welfare varies across generations and corresponds to intergenerational
inequalities.19
4 Environmental policy implications
In this section, we analyze the implications of environmental policy. More precisely, we attempt
to emphasize what policy can allow to avoid intergenerational inequalities in the short-run and to
enhance the long-term growth rate.
4.1 The short-term effect of environmental tax
We point out, previously, that the economy may exhibit complex dynamics when environmental
awareness is endogenous. We wonder then how a tighter environmental tax affects this short-term
situation and how the government should use it to reduce intergenerational inequalities. Focusing on
the BGP in the regime with private maintenance, where damped oscillations may occur, we examine
the effect of an increase in environmental tax on transitional dynamics:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and β > ηκ, when there is private maintenance at the
stable BGP, an increase in τ implies that:
• If the BGP remains in the regime with private maintenance (σ < σˆ(τ)), there exists a σ˜ ∈ (0, 1)
such that:
– For σ < σ˜, the range of κ associated with damped oscillations decreases.
– For σ > σ˜, the range of κ associated with damped oscillations increases.
• If the BGP moves to the regime without private maintenance (σ > σˆ(τ)), there is no damped
oscillations.
Proof. See Appendix 6.4.
From Proposition 3, we highlight that the government intervention can neutralize or generate
damped oscillations. It comes from the fact that policy shapes the trade-off between maintenance
and education spendings, and hence the mechanism driving oscillations.
When σ < min {σ˜; σˆ(τ)}, an increase in environmental tax allows to reduce the case where
oscillations arise. As highlighted in Section 3, cyclical convergence may occur since green preferences
19Such complex dynamics can also illustrate economic volatility, as Varvarigos (2011) emphasizes.
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are endogenous. In this situation, along the convergence path, education variations stem from several
effects through Q, γ1 and h. The former effects drive oscillations while the latter works in the reverse.
As long as σ is low enough, a tighter tax reinforces the impact of human capital on private education
spending. Indeed, the fall in wage, entailed by tax, is overcompensated by the increase in education
subsidy. Education spending is mainly driven by the government’s action and hence become less
sensitive to γ1. As a result, oscillatory trajectories are less frequent, i.e. the critical level of tolerance
to pollution (κ¯) under which damped oscillations may occur is lower.
When σ˜ < σ < σˆ(τ), public revenue devoted to public abatement is high but not enough to be
at the regime without private maintenance. Unlike to the previous case, σ is high enough such that
education subsidy is too low to compensate the decrease in wage. Thus, environmental tax diminishes
the influence of human capital on private education spending and oscillations occur more frequently.
Specifically, the critical level of tolerance to pollution (κ¯) under which damped oscillations may be
observed is higher.
In the previous section, we emphasize that an increase in environmental tax makes the regime
without private maintenance (npm) more frequent (σˆ(τ) goes down) and that the convergence to the
BGP in this regime is always monotonous. Thus, the government may also avoid intergenerational
inequalities by fixing a sufficiently high tax on pollution and devoting a large share of public spending
to maintenance. For a BGP initially in the regime with private maintenance (pm), if σˆ(τ) becomes
lower than σ, the BGP moves to the regime without private maintenance, there is no more trade-off
between private choices and hence transitional dynamics does not result in oscillations.
Thus, from Proposition 3, we point out that with endogenous concerns, the environmental tax may
favor intergenerational inequalities around the BGP when the product of the tax is not correctly used.
The implications of environmental policy in the short-run are rarely studied. A notable exception is
Ono (2003b), who emphasizes that a sufficient increase in environmental tax may shift the economy
from a fluctuating regime to a BGP where capital and environmental quality go up perpetually. In
this paper, we highlight that the use of tax revenue is decisive for such a change.
4.2 The long-term effect of environmental tax
In accordance with the concept of sustainable development20, the environment is also and above
all a long-term concern. In this respect, we want to study what solutions the government can put in
place to achieve higher long-term growth of both human capital and environmental quality. Thus,
we examine how policy affects the stable BGP and the corresponding growth rate.
A tighter environmental policy influences the long-term growth rate through several channels.
First directly, by affecting the trade-off between education and maintenance activities. Second indi-
rectly, by modifying the green development index and environmental preferences.21 Therefore, the
20The Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987) defines the sustainable development as “development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.
21 Note that examining the impact of environmental awareness component on growth, we obtain that the stronger
environmental concerns, the lower the growth rate, as in Prieur and Bre´chet (2013). In their paper, a raise in environ-
mental awareness always reduces physical capital accumulation. Here, γ1 affects growth trough an additional channel as
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global impact is ambiguous. In the following lemma, we investigate how authorities can improve the
growth rate along the stable BGP:
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and β > ηκ, following an increase in τ :
• When the BGP is initially in the npm regime (σ > σˆ(τ)), the growth rate is enhanced for
σ < 11+γ2µ .
• When the BGP is initially in the pm regime (σ < σˆ(τ)):
– If it remains in the pm regime (σ < σˆ(τ)), there exists an interval (σ(τ), σ(τ)) such that
the growth rate goes up for σ(τ) < σ < σ(τ).
– If it moves to the npm regime (σ > σˆ(τ)), the growth rate is enhanced and is higher than
in the pm regime when σ < 11+γ2µ .
Proof. See Appendix 6.5
From Lemma 2, we deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and β > ηκ, for a given σ ∈
(
a
b ;
1
1+γ2µ
)
:
• The growth rate is higher in the npm regime than in the pm one.
• The growth rate in the npm regime is enhanced with a tighter tax.
Proof. See Appendix 6.5
Considering an increase in τ , an economy initially with private maintenance may switch to the
other regime. When the BGP remains in the regime with private maintenance (σ < σˆ(τ)), an
increase in tax favors both human capital and environmental quality if σ is intermediary. When
σ is too low, policy favors mainly education spending. Despite the improvement in γ1 it entails,
the increase in tax makes the private maintenance too expensive, such that the environment may
deteriorate, and so does the growth rate. Conversely, when σ is too high, the tax revenue contributes
mostly to public maintenance. Even if the private investment in environment diminishes (in favor
of education spending), education cost is too high, which may weaken human capital accumulation.
Thus, authorities can increase growth by fixing intermediary value of σ.
When the BGP is or moves to the regime without private maintenance (σ > σˆ(τ)),22 a tighter tax
leads to the highest growth rate as long as it is accompanied by a sufficient support for human capital
(σ < 1/(1 + γ2µ)). The intuition is the following. On one hand, in the npm regime, maintenance
is entirely public despite the willingness of agent to contribute privatively to pollution abatement.
Therefore, the environmental quality is sufficiently good at this regime. On the other hand, when
the environment improves education. Nevertheless, the negative direct impact of environmental awareness on education
more than offsets the improvement of the environment. The proof is available upon request.
22Following an increase in τ , a BGP initally in the npm regime cannot move to the pm regime
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the government allocates a high enough share of its budget to education, the negative effect of tax
on available income is more than offset by the positive effect through education subsidy. In this way,
human capital accumulation and the environment are enhanced.
Note that when σ > 1/(1 + γ2µ), a regime switch can be growth-reducing, particularly if the
increase in τ moving the BGP to the regime without private maintenance is important. In this case,
the negative income effect exceeds the positive impact of education subsidy and hence human capital
accumulation deteriorates.
Our results contribute to the literature on environmental policy and growth. As in Ono (2003a,
2003b), environmental taxation exerts competing effects on the long-run economic growth. However,
while he observes a positive relationship between the tax and the long-term growth only for interme-
diary level of the tax rate, we emphasize that a tighter policy is always growth-enhancing as long as
the tax revenue is well allocated. The relationship that we observe between tax and long-term growth
rate is also tied to results obtained in a recent branch of this literature, that considers the role of
human capital. In a model with a R&D sector reducing pollution, Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007)
find that a higher environmental tax decreases the price of education relatively to the polluting good,
such that a tighter tax always promotes growth. The same link is present in Pautrel (2011, 2012)
when lifetime is finite. In the first paper, this holds when abatement sector is more human capital
intensive than final output sector, while in the second this is due to the fact that pollution stems
from physical capital. In these three studies, the underlying mechanism is that an increase in tax
favors education at expense of polluting activities. We differ from them by pointing out the role of
policy mix. The government can implement a win-win policy only if it allocates properly the revenue
of the environmental tax between education subsidy and public pollution abatement.
We emphasize that the recycling of environmental tax can have double dividend: environmental
quality improvement and economic benefit. However, we differ from the literature on the “double
dividend hypothesis” which considers the economic dividend as an improvement in economic effi-
ciency from the use of environmental tax revenue to reduce other distortionary taxes (e.g. Goulder,
1995 or Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha, 2006). Instead, we emphasize that, when the tax on pol-
luting activities is recycled in public maintenance and education subsidy, policy can promote both
environmental quality and human capital.
4.3 How the government can meet the short-and long-term objectives?
We emphasize previously that, in the short run the government should intervene to avoid in-
tergenerational inequalities, while in the long run it seeks to enhance growth. In this section, we
examine how a tighter tax can satisfy these two objectives. By considering the properties of the
function σˆ(τ), that defines the regimes with and without private maintenance, with the properties of
σMin(τ) and σMax(τ), that determine the possible policy schemes (see Assumption 1), we summarize
the results of Propositions 3 and 4:
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Figure 2: Short-and long-term implications of a tighter tax, at σ given
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This figure depicts the implications of a tighter tax for a given σ. Fourth areas are distinguished.
In areas 1 and 2, the BGP equilibrium is in the regime with private maintenance. Focusing on
the short run, a tighter tax makes the occurrence of oscillations less likely when σ < σ˜ (area 1),
while the opposite holds when σ > σ˜ (area 2). In these areas, to achieve the long-term objective, an
increase in the pollution tax has to be associated with an intermediary level of σ. Unfortunately, no
clear conclusion emerges when comparing these values of σ with the one corresponding to benefit in
the short-run.
As long as the tax rate is sufficiently high, the economy can achieve areas 3 and 4, where the BGP
is in the regime without private maintenance and hence contributions to the pollution abatement
is entirely public. At this state, the short-term issue vanishes and the economy performs a higher
long-term growth rate when education subsidy is sufficiently high (σ low, area 4). Furthermore, as
stressed in Proposition 4, for a given σ, the growth rate is higher in area 4 than in the other regime.
As a result, we identify the most favorable tax scheme as the one where the environmental
protection results exclusively in public spending and education support is sufficiently high. In such
a way, there is no more issue about the trade-off between education and maintenance, which would
lead eventually to damped oscillations and hence to inequalities. Moreover, since public maintenance
and education subsidy are sufficiently high, human capital accumulation is favored without damaging
the environment.
Note that the design of this policy depends on environmental awareness. For a given σ, the higher
green preference parameters, the higher the tax rate required to achieve the area 4 (the curve σˆ(τ)
moves to the right).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the implications of environmental policy on growth when environmen-
tal awareness is endogenously determined by both education and pollution. The government can
strengthen its environmental commitment by increasing a tax on pollution and allocate tax revenue
between two categories of environmental expenditure: direct one with public pollution abatement
and more indirect one through education subsidy. We show that there exists a unique positive BGP,
characterized by sustainable development. It can be either in a regime with private environmental
maintenance or in a regime with only public environmental maintenance, depending on the design
of environmental policy.
When the BGP is with private maintenance, we reveal that the economy may display damped
oscillations for low tolerance to pollution. These oscillations are due to the feedback effect of hu-
man capital and environmental quality on endogenous green preferences, which shapes the trade-off
between private choices. Such complex dynamics makes the welfare vary across generations, and
entails intergenerational inequalities. Conversely, when the BGP is in the regime with only public
maintenance, there is no more private choices in maintenance and hence damped oscillations do not
occur. In addition, we prove that the highest growth rate is achieved in this regime when the share of
public spending devoted to education is sufficiently high. In this case, human capital accumulation
is favored without damaging the environment.
As a result, we reveal that environmental policy plays a crucial role in avoiding intergenera-
tional inequalities and in improving growth of both human capital and environmental quality. More
precisely, we conclude in favor of policy mix and underline that the most favorable policy scheme
corresponds to an intermediary allocation of budget between public environmental maintenance and
education.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We study the properties of the dynamical equation F(Xt), defined on (−κ; +∞).
• When Xt ∈ (−κ ; Λ) the function is given by equation (21 npm). We have lim
Xt→−κ
F(Xt) =
AN(b(1−τ)+bτσ−a)−(1−α)κ
[γ2µA(1−σ)τ ]µ and
F(0) = AN(
β
κ c1(1− τ)b+ (βκ c1 + c2)(bτσ − a))

[
Aγ2µ ( c3(1− τ) + ε2N(bστ − a)) + (1− σ)τA(βκ c1 + (1 + γ2µ)c3)
]µ [
β
κ c1 + (1 + γ2µ)c3
]1−µ
which is strictly positive under Assumption 1. Finally, with equation (19), lim
Xt→Λ
F(Xt) =
(1−α)Λ+AN(bστ−a)

[
γ2µA(1−τ)+(1−σ)τA(1+γ2µ)
1+γ2µ
]µ .
• When Xt ∈ [Λ ; +∞), the function is given by equation (21 pm). We have F(Λ) = v > 0 as
Λ > 0. Moreover, lim
Xt→+∞
F(Xt) = +∞.
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As lim
Xt→Λ
F(Xt) = F(Λ), the function is continue on (κ; +∞).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
pm solution. A BGP in the pm regime is characterized by X¯pm = F(X¯pm). Under Assumption
1, X¯pm 6= 0. Thus we determine the solutions X¯pm which satisfy F(X¯pm)/X¯pm = 1. Using equations
(18) and (21 npm.), it corresponds to (For the sake of simplicity, subscripts on X are removed):
(1− α)
(
β+ηX
κ+X c1 + c2
)
+
AN
(
β+ηX
κ+X c1(b(1−τ)+bτσ−a)−c2(a−bτσ)
)
X
=

[
γ2µ(Ac3(1− τ) + ε2((1− α)X +AN(bτσ − a))) +Aτ(1− σ)
(
c1
β+ηX
κ+X + (1 + γ2µ)c3
)]µ [β+ηX
κ+X c1 + c3(1 + γ2µ)
]1−µ
We define D1(X) and D2(X), respectively the term on the left and on the right hand side. Under
Assumption 1, we have:
• lim
X→−κ
D1(X) = ±∞, lim
X→0−
D1(X) = −∞, lim
X→0+
D1(X) = +∞ and lim
X→+∞
D1(X) = (1 −
α)(ηc1 + c2) > 0. Moreover, D1 is decreasing in X when X > 0.
• lim
X→−κ
D2(X) = +∞, lim
X→0
D2(X) = C > 0, with C a constant and lim
X→+∞
D2(X) = +∞.
Moreover, D2(X) > 0 and D2 is decreasing and then increasing with X.
The curves D1(X) and D2(X) cross at least once in the positive area, what guarantees the existence
of a positive solution. From equation (21 npm.), we have dF(X¯pm)/dX < 1, thus the positive solution
X¯pm is unique. A necessary condition to have negative solution (X¯pm < 0) is that ∃ X ∈ (−κ, 0)
such that D1(X) > 0. It corresponds to:
T (X) ≡ (1−α)X(c1(β+ηX)+c2(κ+X))+AN [c1(b(1−τ)+bτσ−a)(β+ηX)−(a−bτσ)c2(κ+X)] < 0
Under Assumption 1, T (X) is increasing in X and lim
X→−κ
T (X) < 0 if and only if:
−(1− α)κ+AN(b(1− τ) + bστ − a) < 0
Thus, when AN(b(1−τ)+bστ−a) > (1−α)κ, D1(X) < 0 for all X∈(−κ, 0) and there is no negative
solution. When AN(b(1 − τ) + bστ − a) < (1 − α)κ, dynamics may exhibit none, one, or multiple
negative equilibria. To ensure the existence of negative solution(s), the following condition has to be
satisfied F(−κ) > −κ > X∃. From Lemma 1, it corresponds to:
κε2(1− α)−Aε1(1− τ)
Aε2[b(1− τ) + bτσ − a] 6 N 6
κ(1− α− (A(1− σ)τ)µ)
A[b(1− τ) + bτσ − a]
npm solution. The BGP in the npm regime is characterized by X¯npm = F(X¯npm). Using
(21 pm), we obtain:
X¯npm =
AN(bτσ − a)

[
A[γ2µ(1−τ)+(1−σ)τ(1+γ2µ)]
1+γ2µ
]µ − (1− α) (24)
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According to the condition (17) and under Assumption 1, X¯npm exists only if bτσ− a > 0⇔ σ > abτ .
To determine the nature of the BGP, we examine the sign of equation (20) when Xt = X¯npm. When
P(X¯npm) is positive and σ > abτ the solution is in the npm regime, otherwise the solution is in the
pm regime. By replacing X¯npm in equation (20), we obtain the function J (τ, σ), which is increasing
in τ and σ. Under Assumption 1, for τ = 0, J < 0 and does no longer depend on σ and for τ = 1,
we get J > 0 ∀ σ ∈ [0, 1]. We depict a representation of J at given τ :
J (σ, τ)
0
τ = 1
τ ∈ (0, 1)
τ = 0
σ
σc(τ)
6
-
Figure 3: Function J at given τ
We deduce that there exists a σc(τ) decreasing in τ such that J = 0, with lim
τ→0σc(τ) = +∞ and
σc(1) < 0. Thus a minimum level of tax is required to make the npm regime possible. When σ <
σc(τ), we get P(X¯npm) < 0, meaning that the equilibrium is in the pm regime. Respectively, when
σ > σc(τ) we get P(X¯npm) > 0, and from equations (20) and (24) we have X¯npm > Λ if and only if
σ > abτ . Thus, the BGP is in the npm regime when σ > Max
{
σc(τ); abτ
} ≡ σˆ(τ) and in the pm regime
when σ < σˆ(τ). When σ = σˆ(τ), the BGP is in the npm regime if σˆ(τ) = σc(τ) and in the pm regime
if σˆ(τ) = abτ . Note that under Assumption 1, σˆ(τ) > σMin(τ) and limτ→1 σˆ(τ) < limτ→1 σMax(τ).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
pm solution. We use the scaling parameter  in order to normalize the steady state X¯pm to one.
There is a unique solution ∗ such that X¯pm = 1 and from equation (21 npm.), the expression of the
normalization constant is given by:
∗(X¯pm) ≡ (1− α) X¯pm [γ¯1c1 + c2] +AN(γ¯1c1b(1− τ) + (γ¯1c1 + c2)(bτσ − a))[
γ2µA c3(1− τ) + γ2µε2
[
(1− α)X¯pm +AN(bστ − a)
]
+ (1− σ)τA(γ¯1 c1 + (1 + γ2µ)c3)
]µ [γ¯1 c1 + (1 + γ2µ)c3]1−µ
Then, by differentiating equation (21 npm.) and analyzing it around the steady state X¯pm = 1 and
 ≡ ∗(X¯pm), we obtain:
dXt+1 =
((1−α)(γ¯1c1+c2+γ¯1′c1)+ANγ¯1′c1(b(1−τ)+bτσ−a))B1B2−B3(µB2(γ2µε2(1−α)+(1−σ)Aτγ¯1′c1)+(1−µ)γ′1c1B1)
B3B1B2 dXt
(25)
with γ¯1 = β+ηκ+1 , γ¯1′ = (κη− β)/(1 + κ)2, B1 = γ2µA c3(1− τ) + γ2µε2 [(1− α) +AN(bστ − a)] + (1−
σ)τA(γ¯1 c1 + (1 + γ2µ)c3), B2 = γ¯1 c1 + c3(1 + γ2µ) and B3 = (1 − α)(γ¯1 c1 + c2) + AN(γ¯1c1b(1 −
21
τ) + (γ¯1c1 + c2)(bτσ − a)).
From (25), we get dXt+1/dXt < 1. Thus, when dXt+1/dXt > 0, transitional dynamics is
monotonous and the BGP equilibrium is locally stable. Using equation (25), we have dXt+1/dXt > 0
if and only if:
B2(1− α) (γ¯1c1 + c2) [γ2µB5 + (1− σ)τAB2)]
− B2(1− α)γ2µ2 [γ¯1c1(B5 − ε1A(1− τ)) + c2ε2(1− α+AN(bτσ − a))]
+ γ¯1′c1B5
[
γ2µ2B2B4 + bN(1 + γ2µ) [(1− µ)γ2µB5 + (1− σ)τAB2]
]
> 0
with B4 ≡ 1− α+AN(b(1− τ) + bτσ − a) and B5 ≡ Ac3(1− τ) + ε2(1− α+AN(bτσ − a)).
Rewriting this expression, we have dXt+1/dXt > 0 if and only if the following polynomial is positive:
R(β) ≡ a1β3 + a2β2 + a3β + a4
with a4 > 0 and expressions for a1, a2 and a3 given by:
a1 =
c31
(1 + κ)3 (1− σ)(1− α)τA > 0
a2 = c
2
1
(1+κ)3 (κ+ 1)(1− α)
[
γ2µ(1− µ)B5 + (1− σ)τA[2c3(1 + γ2µ) + c2] + γ2µ2ε1A(1− τ)
]
+ c
2
1
(1+κ)3
[
3ηc1(1− α)(1− σ)τA− B5
(
γ2µ
2B4 + bAN(1 + γ2µ)τ(1− σ)
)]
a3 = c
3
1η
2(1−σ)(1−α)τA
(1+κ)3 +
2κηc21
(1+k)2 (1− α)
[
γ2µ(1− µ)B5 + (1− σ)τA[2c3(1 + γ2µ) + c2] + γ2µ2ε1A(1− τ)
]
+ c1(1−α)1+κ
[
3(1− σ)τAc2c3(1 + γ2µ) + (1− µ)γ2µB5(c3(1 + γ2µ) + c2) + 2γ2µ2A(1− τ)ε1c3(1 + γ2µ)
]
+ c
2
1η(κ−1)
(1+κ)3 B5
[
γ2µ
2B4 + bN(1 + γ2µ)(1− σ)τA
]
− c1B5(1+κ)2
[
γ2µ
2c3(1 + γ2µ)B4 + bN(1 + γ2µ)(γ2µ(1− µ)B5 + (1− σ)τAc3(1 + γ2µ))
]
There exists a critical level κ¯ such that a2 > 0 and a3 > 0 for κ > κ¯ with
κ¯ ≡ (µ
2γ2((1−α)+AN(b(1−τ)+bτσ−a))+bτ(1−σ)AN(1+γ2µ))(Ac3(1−τ)+ε2(1−α)+ε2AN(bτσ−a))−3ηc1(1−σ)τA
(1−α)[γ2µε2(1−µ)(1−α+AN(bστ−a))+(1−σ)τAc1(1+γ2µ)+γ2µA(1−τ)(ε1+ε2bN(1−µ))] − 1
When κ > κ¯, we have that R(β) > 0 and dynamics is locally stable and monotonous. Under this
level, several scenario may emerge. When σ ∈ [0, 1), equation R(β) = 0 admits none or two positive
solutions. Since a3 > 0, oscillations are observed (R(β) < 0) only if the polynomial admits two
positive solutions, i.e for intermediary β. For τ = 0 or σ = 1, R(β) is a polynomial of degree two.
In this case, when κ < κ¯ there exists a β¯ over which the dynamics is oscillatory. We deduce by
continuity that for a sufficiently high σ, oscillations occur for intermediary β.
We examine the stability of the equilibrium when dynamic is oscillatory. From equation (25), we
have dXt+1/dXt > −1 if and only if:
[(1− α)(γ¯1c1 + c2 + γ¯1′c1) +ANγ¯1′c1(b(1− τ) + bτσ − a)]B1B2 + B1B2B3
− [(1− µ)c1γ¯1′B1 + B2µ (γ2µε2(1− α) + (1− σ)Aτγ¯1′c1)]B3 > 0
22
Replacing expressions B1, B1 and B3, we finally obtain:
c3(1 + γ2µ)c2(1− α)(B6 + ε2bNµ) + γ2µ(γ¯1c1)2(B6(1− α) + B5B4)
+ γ¯1c1(1 + γ2µ)[(1− α)ε1(B6 + ε2bNµ) + γ2µε1(1− α+AN(bτσ − a)) + c3(B4 + B6)]
+ γ2µγ¯1′c1(1 + γ2µ)(B4c3 − (1− µ)ε1(1− α+AN(bτσ − a)))
+ γ2µ2γ¯1′γ¯1c21B5B4 + B5c3(1 + γ2µ)c2(1− α+AN(bτσ − a))
+ (1− σ)τA(γ¯1c1 + c3(1 + γ2µ))γ′1c1bN(1 + γ2µ)B5
+ (1− σ)τA(γ¯1c1 + c3(1 + γ2µ))2[γ¯1c1B4 + c2(1− α+AN(bτσ − a)) + (1− α)(γ¯1c1 + c2)]
with B6 = c2 + ε2bN(1 + γ2µ) > 0.
As −γ¯1′ < γ¯1 and c3B4 > bNB5, we easily see that this term is always positive. The positive
BGP equilibrium is always locally stable.
npm solution. The npm BGP is obtain from (21 pm) and given in Appendix 6.2. We
differentiate equation (21 pm) and obtain:
dF(Xt)
dXt
= (1− α)

[
A[γ2µ(1−τ)+(1−σ)τ(1+γ2µ)]
1+γ2µ
]µ
Under Assumption 1, the slope of F(Xt) in the npm regime is always positive and lower than one,
the npm BGP is thus monotonously stable.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We examine Sign
{
∂κ¯
∂τ
}
using the expression of κ¯ given in Appendix 6.3:
Sign
{
∂κ¯
∂τ
}
= (1− σ)bAN(1 + γ2µ(1− µ))(S2 − τAε2bN(1− σ))(τ(1− σ)S3 + (1− τ)γ2µAε1)
−(1− σ)(bτ(1− σ)AN(1 + γ2µ(1− µ)) + S1)(ε2ANbS4 + S3S2)− 3(1− σ)ηc1AS4
+Aε1µ3(1− α+AN(b− a))(S1 + bτ(1− σ)AN(1 + γ2µ(1− µ)))
with S1 = µ2γ2(1−α+AN(b−a)), S2 = A(1− τ)ε1 + ε2(AN(b−a) + 1−α), S3 = A(3ε1(1 +γ2µ) + 2ε2bN +
γ2µε2bN(1 + µ)) and S4 = γ2µ(ε2(1− µ)(1− α+AN(b− a)) +Aε1)
We can defined Sign
{
∂κ¯
∂τ
}
as a polynomial of degree three in σ, with ∂κ¯∂τ > 0 when σ = 1 and
∂κ¯
∂τ < 0 when σ = 0. Since Sign
{
∂κ¯
∂τ
}
is increasing in σ for σ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a critical value
σ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that: for 0 < σ < σ˜, ∂κ¯∂τ < 0 and for σ˜ < σ < 1, ∂κ¯∂τ > 0. Moreover, under Assumption
1, limτ→0 σMin(τ) < σ˜ < limτ→1 σMax(τ).
6.5 Proof of Lemma 2 and Proposition 4
We examine impact of taxation on the BGP growth rate.
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pm solution. Using equation (22 npm) with Xt = X¯pm we have:
Sign
(
∂gpm
∂τ
)
= V2
(
(1− σ)(γ¯1c1 + c3)− σγ2µε1 + γ2µε2(1− α)∂X¯pm∂τ
)
+ c1(β−ηκ)(κ+X¯pm)2
∂X¯pm
∂τ γ2µ (V1 − τ(1− σ)AV2)
with V1 = γ2µAc3(1− τ) + γ2µε2
[
(1− α)X¯pm +AN(bστ − a)
]
+ (1− σ)τA(γ¯1c1 + (1 + γ2µ)c3) and
V2 = γ¯1c1 + (1 + γ2µ)c3. From the implicit function theorem and equation (21), we have:
∂X¯pm
∂τ =
V2X¯pmA[(γ¯1c1(σ−1)+σc2)V1N−µV3(−σε1γ2µ+(1−σ)(γ¯1c1+c3))]
c1X¯pm(β−ηκ)
(κ+X¯pm)2
(V1V2(X¯pm(1−α)+AN(b(1−τ)+bτσ−a))−µV2V3(1−σ)τA+(1−µ)V1V3)+µV2V3X¯pmγ2µε2(1−α)+ANV1V2V4
with V3 = (1−α)X¯pm [γ¯1c1 + c2]+AN [γ¯1c1b(1− τ) + (γ¯1c1 + c2)(bτσ − a)] and V4 = c2(bτσ−a)+ γ¯1c1b(1−
τ(1− σ))
Thus, substituting ∂X¯pm∂τ in Sign
(
∂gpm
∂τ
)
, we finally obtain:
Sign
(
∂gpm
∂τ
)
=
(
γ2µε2(1− α)V2X¯pmAN + c1X¯pmAN(β−ηκ)(κ+X¯pm)2 [V1 − τ(1− σ)AV2]
)
(γ¯1c1(σ − 1) + σc2)
+
(
c1X¯pm(β−ηκ)
(κ+X¯pm)2
[
V2(X¯pm(1− α) +AN(b(1− τ) + bτσ − a)) + V3
]
+ V2V4AN
)
(−σε1γ2µ+ (1− σ)(γ¯1c1 + c3))V1
Under Assumption 1, policy improves the BGP growth rate when the following sufficient condition
is satisfied:
f1(σ) < σ < f2(σ)
with f1(σ) ≡ γ¯1c1γ¯1c1+c2 < 1 and f2(σ) ≡
γ¯1c1+c3
γ¯1c1+c2+γ2µε1 < 1. These two functions are increasing
in γ¯1, and as ∂γ¯1∂X¯pm < 0 and
∂X¯pm
∂σ > 0, they are decreasing in σ. As a result, there exists a
unique range of value [σ(τ);σ(τ)] which satisfies this condition. Moreover, under Assumption 1,
limτ→0 σMin(τ) < σ(τ) < σ(τ) < limτ→1 σMax(τ).
npm solution. We use equation (22 pm) with Xt = X¯npm and deduce:
Sign
(
∂gc
∂τ
)
= 1− σ(1 + γ2µ)
A tighter tax is growth promoting as long as σˆ(τ) < σ < 1/(1 + γ2µ).
Regime switch. We consider the case where an increase in τ leads the economy from a pm
regime to a npm regime. The opposite switch cannot be observed as σˆ(τ) is decreasing in τ . For a
given σ, we compare equations (22 npm) and (22 pm), by considering a higher tax rate in the npm
regime (τN ) than in the pm one (τP ). The growth rate in the pm regime is higher than in the npm
if and only if:
γ2µ(1 + γ2µ)
(
c3A(τN − τP ) + ε2((1− α)X¯pm +AN(σbτP − a))
)
−(1− σ)A(γ1c1 + (1 + γ2µ)c3)(τN − τP )−Aγ2µ(1− τN )γ1c1 > 0
24
This expression is increasing in σ and from (19) is never satisfied when σ = 1/(1+γ2µ). And according
to Appendix 6.2, the npm regime exists only if ab < σ. Thus, for a given σ ∈ (a/b ; 1/(1 + γ2µ)),
the growth rate in the npm regime is higher than in the pm one. Moreover, under Assumption 1,
σMin(τ) < 1/(1 + γ2µ) < σMax(τ).
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